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Emerging Economies After the Global 
Financial Crisis: the Case of Brazil 
By Enrique R. Carrasco* & Sean Williams** 
Abstract: Emerging economies have rebounded relatively quickly from the 2008 
global financial crisis, and despite various challenges they face resulting from 
the European sovereign debt crisis, they face bright economic futures.  While 
many observers have focused on China and India, Brazil is an emerging 
economy that has enjoyed increasing visibility.  This Article examines Brazil’s 
evolution into an emerging economy, or given the market-based nature of the 
term, an emerging market economy (EME).  The economic, social, political, and 
legal reforms that have contributed to Brazil’s status as an EME have bolstered 
the power and legitimacy of its voice in international affairs, giving the country 
an important role in articulating a new global order as envisioned by former 
president Lula da Silva.  However, its voice will resonate only to the extent it 
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“The issues at the core of our concerns – the financial crisis, new global 
governance and climate change – have a strong common denominator. It is the 
need to build a new international order that is sustainable, multilateral and less 
asymmetric, free of hegemonies and ruled by democratic institutions. This new 
world is a political and moral imperative. We cannot just shovel away the rubble 
of failure; we must be midwives to the future! This is the only way to make 
repairs for so much injustice and to prevent new collective tragedies.” 
President H. E. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Emerging economies rock, so they say.  While the United States 
struggles to recover from the 2008 global financial crisis and European 
countries have been mired in a sovereign debt crisis, emerging economies 
rebounded relatively quickly from the 2008 global financial crisis, and 
despite various challenges they face resulting from the European crisis, they 
face bright economic futures. 
While many observers have focused on China and India, Brazil is an 
emerging economy that has enjoyed increasing visibility.  Since 2003, it has 
pursued an orthodox macroeconomic framework that brought inflation 
under control, produced primary budget surpluses, decreased foreign debt, 
and increased foreign reserves.  The resultant economic growth reached a 
peak in 2010, when it registered a 7.5% annual growth rate in gross 
domestic product,
1
 which far exceeded the average annual global growth 
 
 1  Jeff Fick, Update: Brazil’s Economic Growth Slows to a Crawl in 3Q, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20111206-704224.html. 
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rate of 4.3% for that year.
2
  Despite the knock-on effects of the European 
sovereign debt crisis and the government’s concerted effort to slow 
economic growth to curb inflation,
3
 analysts predict an annual growth rate 
for Brazil of 3.3% in 2012.
4
  In 2011, Brazil overtook the U.K. as the sixth-
largest economy in the world.
5
 
This Article examines Brazil’s evolution into an emerging economy, 
or given the market-based nature of the term, an emerging market economy 
(EME)—we will use the terms interchangeably.  We begin in Part II by 
outlining the broadly accepted definition of an EME.  The term generally 
refers to dynamic economies that have attracted considerable investor 
interest, and are gaining economic and political clout on the global stage.  
EME’s are nevertheless “emerging” to the extent that their economies 
continue to be impeded by a number of factors ranging from policy failures 
to inequality. 
Part III examines Brazil’s path towards becoming an EME—the “pre-
emergent” Brazil.  We cover four periods in this pre-emergent era.  The first 
is the post-independence economic stagnation in the nineteenth century.  
The second is the period of high economic growth that commenced in the 
early twentieth century.  This period, which came to an end with the debt 
crisis of the early 1980s, included the adoption of import substitution 
policies and the onset of the “Brazilian Miracle” from 1968 to 1973.  The 
third period addresses Brazil’s debt crisis of the 1980s and its experience 
during the “lost decade.”  During this period, President Sarney introduced 
the ultimately unsuccessful “Cruzado Plan,” which introduced a new 
currency (the cruzado) and froze prices and exchange rates after de-
indexing the economy.  The fourth period included significant economic 
reforms under Fernando Collor de Mello and the implementation of the 
“Real Plan” designed by Finance Minister and future President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, which, among other things, introduced a new currency 
(the real), tightened monetary policy, introduced a managed-float exchange 
rate system, cut spending, and increased taxes. 
Part IV explains why, thanks to the reforms of Presidents Cardoso and 
 
 2  GDP Growth (Annual %), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/BR-
XJ?display=graph (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
 3  Press Release, Council For The Americas, 8th Annual Latin American Predictors 
Forum: Economic, Financial and Trade Predictions for 2012 (Dec. 2, 2011). 
 4  Raymond Colitt, Brazil’s GDP Growth of 2.7% Last Year Underperformed BRIC 
Peers: Economy, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-
06/brazil-s-gdp-growth-of-2-7-last-year-underperformed-bric-peers-economy.html. 
 5  Sara Miller Llana, Brazil Bumps Britain to Become World’s Sixth Largest Economy, 
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Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, Brazil is now considered an EME.  Lula 
followed Cardoso’s orthodox economic policy that reduced interest rates 
and fostered greater ties with other developing countries to help decrease 
Brazil’s dependence on the Global North for its exports.  Brazil has also 
benefited from policies favoring improved infrastructure, international 
trade, increased foreign direct investment, and improved government 
institutions.  Importantly, Lula increased Brazil’s influence internationally, 
as evidenced by reforms at the International Monetary Fund and G-20. 
Part V addresses Brazil’s remaining challenges, including excessive 
spending, continued over-dependence on commodity exports, corruption, 
problematic regulatory and legal frameworks, an inefficient judiciary, and 
inequality. 
Part VI concludes this Article.  The post-crisis global state of affairs 
has provided emerging economies, especially the so-called “BRICS”—
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—with a platform to 
articulate the framework for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).
6
  
The question is whether Brazil should help resurrect the NIEO of the 1970s.  
We conclude that it should not.  Instead, Brazil should rely on its rich 
history to promote an ethically-based NIEO. 
 
 6  See Towards a New International Economic Order, U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 2nd 
comm. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.2/64/L.16 (Nov. 2, 2009); see also RUMU SARKAR, 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL FINANCE 9 
(2009) (“[T]rade relations and capital investments are being ‘rationalized’ in a new 
international economic order that does not conform to the outlines of the postcolonialist 
relations of the past.”); Ruth Gordon, The Dawn of a New, New International Economic 
Order?, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (2009); Tiffany Limsico, Global Governance on the 
Making: Prospects for a New World Order in Tackling Economic Injustice, 16 TRANSITION 
STUD. REV. 520 (2009); Beatriz Bissio, Emerging Powers Cooking up New International 
Order, GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS & POL. ECON. (Apr. 16, 2010), 
http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/04/16/emerging-powers-cooking-up-new-
international-order/; Carlos Garramòn, Pittsburg: “The World is Heading Toward a New 
International Economic Order”, OPINIONSUR (Oct. 2009), http://opinionsur.org.ar/Pittsburg-
The-World-is-Heading; Andrew E. Kramer, Four Nations Seek More Diversity in Global 
Economic Order, N. Y. TIMES, June 19, 2009, at 10, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00EED91131F934A25755C0A96F9C8B
63; Kevin Muehring, New World Order the Balance of Power at the IMF Is Shifting to 
Developing Countries, 43 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 7 (2009); Phil Ruthven, A New World 
Order, 31 BUS. REV. WKLY. 19 (2009); Robert J. Samuelson, A New Economic Order, 
NEWSWEEK, May 10, 2010, at 24, available at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/04/30/a-new-economic-order.html; Mansoor 
Dailami & Paul R. Masson, The New Multi-Polar International Monetary System (World 
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5147, 2009); Jagadeesh Gokhale, Toward a New 
Economic Order, CATO INST. (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12074. 
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II. WHAT IS AN “EMERGING MARKET ECONOMY”? 
Antoine van Agtmael of the World Bank’s International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) coined the term “emerging market” in 1981.
7
  At the 
time, he was attempting to start a “Third World Equity Fund,” but he had to 
come up with a more dynamic name to attract investors.
8
  Emerging 
markets were characterized by growing economies and increased wealth 
with low-to-middle per capita income.
9
  The basic notion was that emerging 
economies, such as the East Asian Tigers of the 1980s (South Korea, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan), were “emerging” because they were 
becoming significant players in the modern global economy.
10
 
The IFC’s origination of the term indicates that it was investor driven.  
Thus, in 1992 the IFC’s Farida Khambata coined the term “frontier 
markets” for economies that had not reached the status of emerging markets 
(because of, say, small market capitalization
11
), but nevertheless presented 
promising investment opportunities.
12
  Moreover, in 2001, Goldman Sachs 
singled out Brazil, Russia, India, and China—the “BRICs”—as countries 
that, because of their increased global clout, should be considered for 
inclusion in the G-7.
13
  Today, the keen interest in investing in emerging 
 
 7  Ins and Outs: Acronyms BRIC Out All Over, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2008, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/12080703?story_id=12080703. 
 8  Id. (“Racking my brain, at last I came up with a term that sounded more positive and 
invigorating: emerging markets. ‘Third World’ suggested stagnation; ‘emerging markets’ 
suggested progress, uplift, and dynamism.”). 
 9  Christopher B. Barry et al., Performance Characteristics of Emerging Capital Markets, 
54 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 72, 72 (1998). 
 10  The literature regarding the East Asian Tigers is vast.  See, e.g., ASIAN DEVELOPMENT 
BANK, EMERGING ASIA: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES (1997); COLM FOY ET AL., THE FUTURE 
OF ASIA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1998); INDERMIT GILL & HOMI KHARAS, AN EAST ASIAN 
RENAISSANCE: IDEAS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH (2007), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEASTASIAPACIFIC/Resources/226262-
1158536715202/EA_Renaissance_full.pdf; RAMKISHEN S. RAJAN, EMERGING ASIA: ESSAYS 
ON CRISES, CAPITAL FLOWS, FDI, AND EXCHANGE RATES (2011); Paul Krugman, The Myth of 
Asia’s Miracle, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 62 (1994); Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, Asia’s 
Reemergence, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 43 (1997); Pietro Cova et al., Global Imbalances: The Role 
of Emerging Asia (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/64, 2009). 
 11  Wei Li & Richard Hoyer-Ellefsen, Characteristics of Emerging Markets 3 (Investing 
in Emerging Markets Technical Note Series, Working Paper No. 1, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=909890 (“In fact, market depth is the main distinction between 
emerging and frontier market countries.”). 
 12  Ben R. Marshall et al., Frontier Market Diversification and Transaction Costs 
(October 11, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942592.  
Frontier markets include Argentina, Kuwait, Romania, Sri Lanka, Qatar, Ukraine, and 
Vietnam.  Id. at 7. 
 13  Jim O’Neill, Global Economic Paper No.66: Building Better Global Economic BRICs, 
GOLDMAN SACHS ECON. RES., Nov. 30, 2001, at 3.  The G-7 is a forum for international 
economic discussions.  Its members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.  The G-7 is now often referred to as the G-8, with Russia 
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markets is embodied in Morgan Stanley Capital Market International’s 
emerging market indices, such as the MSCI Emerging Market Index, which 
are followed by nearly ninety percent of emerging market managers.
14
  
Currently, the MSCI Emerging Market Index consists of twenty-one 
emerging country indices: Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 




Although “emerging economy” lacks a precise definition, common 
themes have emerged since the term’s inception.  Emerging market 
economies, as illustrated by those listed above, are characterized by 
significant and rapid economic growth evidenced by rising gross domestic 
product (GDP) in an aggregate and per capita basis, increased trade 
volumes, as well as increased foreign reserves.
16
 
Emerging economies are also hosts to increased foreign investment.
17
  
Foreign investment fuels rapid economic growth, as investors seek out 
higher profit margins.
18
  Countries can attract investors by pursuing market-
 
being the eighth member.  What is the G8?, G8 INFORMATION CENTRE,  
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2012). 
 14  The Long View: How Adventurous are Emerging Markets?, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2006, 
6:48 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/be77e600-605f-11db-a716-
0000779e2340.html#axzz1fsi1MoZP. 
 15  Index Definitions, MCSI (May 30, 2011) 
http://www.msci.com/products/indices/tools/index.html#EM. 
 16  M. AYHAN KOSE & ESWAR S. PRASAD, EMERGING MARKETS: RESILIENCE AND GROWTH 
AMID GLOBAL TURMOIL 2 (2010); see also Richard Harmsen & Nagwa Riad, Trading Places, 
48 FIN. & DEV. 44, 45 (2011) (observing a marked increase in both trade volumes and 
interconnectedness in emerging markets); Robert E. Hoskisson et al., Strategy in Emerging 
Economies, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 249, 249 (2000) (noting that EMEs are characterized by 
rapid economic development); Dani Rodrik, The Social Cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves, 
20 INT’L ECON. J. 3, 4 (2006) (noting that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is a 
response to the series of financial crises that struck emerging markets in the 1990s, after 
which some observers suggested larger foreign exchange reserves would have allowed the 
suffering countries to prevent contagion more effectively); Luis Orgaz et al., The Growing 
Weight of the Emerging Economies in the World Economy and Governance: The Case of the 
BRICs 2 (Banco de Espana, Occasional Paper No. 1101, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1797583. 
 17  LINCOLN GORDON, BRAZIL’S SECOND CHANCE: EN ROUTE TOWARD THE FIRST WORLD 
15–16 (2001); see also Orgaz et al., supra note 16, at 24–25. 
 18  KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 53; see also DALE R. WEIGEL ET AL., FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 13–15 (1997).  Foreign investment is helpful in several ways.  Foreign 
investors bring large sums of foreign exchange (which helps ease balance-of-payment 
concerns in the host market), technology, administrative expertise, and training capacity—all 
of which help make an economy more efficient.  See WERNER BAER, THE BRAZILIAN 
ECONOMY: GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 240–41 (5th ed. 2001).  Increased FDI has also been 
associated with export diversification, wage increases, and rising employment.  Andrea 
Amaro & William Miles, Racing to the Bottom for FDI?: The Changing Role of Labor Costs 
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based reforms ranging from orthodox macroeconomic policies to being 
open to international trade—hence, one encounters the interchangeable term 
“emerging market economies” (EMEs).
19
  Orthodox macroeconomic 
policies include, among other things, privatization of state-owned 
businesses,
20
 liberalization of domestic banking systems and stock markets 
to allow foreigners easier access,
21
 and decreased debt.
22
  As for trade, 
EMEs are generally more open to international trade than other economies, 
including advanced economies.
23
  While this openness is spurred initially 
by export-led growth models, it functions to diversify the goods countries 
export.
24
  Diversification and general integration into the international 
economy help reduce the effects of sudden changes in global prices or other 





and Infrastructure, 40 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 1, 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4193013. 
 19  KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 53; see also Wiegel, supra note 18, at 10; 
Giuseppina Maria Chiara Talamo, FDI, Mode of Entry and Corporate Governance, in 
GEOGRAPHY, STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND EMPIRICS 
29, 60–61 (2009), available at http://growthbook4.ec.unipi.it/Chapter2.pdf. 
 20  KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 53; see also Mary M. Shirley, Privatization and 
Performance, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 669, 670 (1993) (“Privatization is viewed 
as one way to break the direct link between the enterprise and the government and, in the 
process, to improve performance, raise capital, and reduce the government’s exposure to 
commercial risk.”). 
 21  KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 53; see also Geert Bekaert et al., Does Financial 
Liberalization Spur Growth?, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3 (2001) (arguing that equity market 
liberalization leads to a one percent increase in real economic growth over a five-year period 
on average); Harjoat Singh Bhamra, Stock Market Liberalization and the Cost of Capital in 
Emerging Markets 1 (Mar. 19, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1365041. 
 22  KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 57; see also Martin Feldstein, A Self-Help Guide 
for Emerging Markets, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 93, 102 (1999). 
 23  KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 57; see also Orgaz et al., supra note 16, at 22. 
 24  KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 41; see also Rudiger Dornbusch, The Case for 
Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 71–72 (1992) 
(explaining how the negative effects of protectionism on export industries often leads to 
liberalization); Allen Dennis & Ben Shepherd, Trade Costs, Barriers to Entry, and Export 
Diversification in Developing Countries 1 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 4368, 2007) (arguing that for every 1% reduction in trade costs, there is a subsequent 
0.3–0.4% increase in export diversification). 
 25  KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 71; see also John E. Wagner & Steven C. Deller, 
Measuring the Effects of Economic Diversity on Growth and Stability, 74 LAND ECON. 541, 
542 (1998) (arguing that diversification is necessary for long-term economic stability, 
though specialization is necessary to spur short-term growth); Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew 
Warner, Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, BROOKINGS PAPER ON 
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Economic factors are not the sole criteria used to designate EMEs.  
Significant economic growth can translate into increased political influence 
on a regional and international scale.
26
  The level of international political 
clout varies from country to country, but EMEs generally are gaining power 
and influence internationally, especially compared to other developing 
countries.
27
  They are leaders in their respective regions, and are frequently 




The term EME suggests that a country so labeled has made significant 
strides towards joining the ranks of “developed countries.”  However, 
“emerging” also suggests that an EME’s development is somehow 
hindered.  The typical factors that highlight this characteristic relate to 
policy failures, weak institutional structures, underdeveloped and poorly 
regulated financial sectors, and inequality.  Policy failures, including 
ineffective monetary and exchange rate policies
29
 and public investment 






 26  Jim O’Neill et al., Global Economic Paper No.134: How Solid are the BRICs?,  
GOLDMAN SACHS ECON. RES., Dec. 1, 2005, at 3; see also Orgaz et al., supra note 16, at 32. 
 27  Quentin Peel, Risks Rise in Shift to a Multipolar World, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at 
8. 
 28  See, e.g., Juan de Onis, Brazil’s New Capitalism, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 107, 109 (2000) 
(discussing Brazil as a political and economic leader in Latin America). 
 29  Paul Krugman, Dutch Tulips and Emerging Economies, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 28, 30 
(1995) (noting that unsustainable exchange rates are behind the speculative attacks, which 
EMEs have been famous for facing in the last two decades); Charalambos Tsangarides, 
Crisis and Recovery: Role of Exchange Rate Regime in Emerging Market Economies 3 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/242, 2010) (showing that countries with floating 
exchange rate regimes have recovered from the global financial crisis faster than countries 
with crawling peg regimes); see also Federico Ravenna & Fabio M. Natalucci, Monetary 
Policy Choices in Emerging Market Economies: The Case of High Productivity Growth, 40 
J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 243 (2008); but see Harun Alp et al., An Assessment of 
Malaysian Monetary Policy During the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 (Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Working Paper No.12/35, 2012) (arguing that Malaysian Central Bank effectively 
maneuvered its monetary policy to combat the negative effects of the global financial crisis). 
 30  Klaus E. Meyer, Perspectives on Multinational Enterprises in Emerging Economies, 
35 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 259, 260 (2004) (“[EMEs] typically have less sophisticated market 
supporting institutions and fewer locational advantages based on created assets, such as 
infrastructure and human capital.”) (citations omitted).  Infrastructure is especially important 
for countries seeking to attract FDI while improving the domestic standard of living by 
raising wages.  Amaro & Miles, supra note 18, at 3 (“[B]etter infrastructure can increase the 
productivity of labor. Thus, even if wages rise, higher productivity based on solid, 
dependable infrastructure can lead to lower unit labor costs, and allow for higher incomes 
without causing a loss of investment.”).  Mexico is an example of an EME with rising wages 
that has been held back by poor infrastructure.  Id. 
 31  Eric A. Hanushek & Ludger Wobmann, The Role of Education Quality in Economic 
Growth 51–58 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4122, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=960379.  The literature is split as to the extent to which education 
  











(or human capital) is necessary for economic growth. Daniel Cohen & Marcelo Soto, 
Growth and Human Capital: Good Data, Good Results, 12 J. ECON. GROWTH 51, 51–52 
(2007).  The first wave of research on the topic, referred to as “New Growth Theory,” found 
a strong positive correlation between educational attainment and economic growth.  See, 
e.g., Robert E. Lucas Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 3 (1988); Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71 
(1990).  Several authors later challenged this view, saying that previous research had 
overstated the value of education to economic growth, but not negating its value entirely.  
See, e.g., Jess Benhabib & Mark M. Speigel, The Role of Human Capital in Economic 
Development: Evidence from Aggregate Cross-Country Data, 34 J. MONETARY ECON. 143 
(1994); Lant Pritchett, Where Has All the Education Gone?, 15 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 
367 (2001); Mark Bils & Peter J. Klenow, Does Schooling Cause Growth?, 90 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1160 (2000).  Cohen and Soto argue that the differences between the authors arise due 
to differences in the measurement and definition of “human capital”—a phrase which easily 
eludes precise definition.  Cohen & Soto, supra note 31, at 52.  Hanushek and Wobmann 
argue that studies showing only a small connection between education and economic growth 
focus on years of education instead of cognitive abilities of the workforce.  Hanushek 
&Wobmann, supra note 31, at 1–4.  They note that there is a very strong correlation between 
cognitive ability of the workforce and economic growth.  Id. 
 32  Halima A. Qureshi & Hasina A. Mohyuddin, Health Status, Diseases, and Economic 
Development: A Cross-Country Analysis, 39 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 121, 122 (2006) 
(observing that developing countries account for ninety percent of the global disease 
burden); see also WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING IN HEALTH 
17 (1993) (“Improved health contributes to economic growth in four ways: it reduces 
production losses caused by worker illness; it permits the use of natural resources that had 
been totally or nearly inaccessible because of disease; it increases the enrollment of children 
in school and makes them better able to learn; and it frees for alternative uses resources that 
would otherwise have to be spent on treating illness.”); David Wheeler, Basic Needs 
Fulfillment and Economic Growth: A Simultaneous Model, 7 J. DEV. ECON. 435 (1980) 
(showing that improved health conditions increase labor productivity and GDP growth). 
 33  Eswar S. Prasad, Financial Sector Regulation and Reform in Emerging Markets: An 
Overview, in FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND REFORMS IN EMERGING MARKETS 3, 11 
(Masahiro Kawai & Edward S. Prasad eds., 2011) (“A basic priority in emerging markets is 
to strengthen the institutional framework in order to promote financial stability.”).  
Regulations of intellectual property rights, taxation, capital markets, and competition are 
often cited as examples of potential growth inhibitors for developing countries.  See, e.g., 
David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323 (1996) (showing a correlation between strong 
intellectual property protection and economic growth, especially in open market economies); 
Alireza Naghavi, Strategic Intellectual Property Rights Policy and North-South Technology 
Transfer, 143 REV. WORLD ECON. 55 (2007) (arguing that strong protection of intellectual 
property rights is in developing countries’ best interests because such protection encourages 
FDI and technology transfer); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capital Market Liberalization, Economic 
Growth, and Instability, 28 WORLD DEV. 1075 (2000) (arguing, in the aftermath of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, that total capital market liberalization has a destabilizing effect on 
countries, but that capital market liberalization, with proper controls on short-term capital 
flows, will spur economic growth without the destabilizing side effects of total 
liberalization); Jean-Jacques Laffont, Competition, Information, and Development, in 
ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1998, at 237–57 (Boris 
Pleskovic & Joseph Stiglitz eds., 1998); Vito Tanzi & Howell H. Zee, Tax Policy for 
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) raise transaction costs for foreign and domestic investors, which 
makes doing business in that country more difficult and scares away 
potential investors.
36
  The presence of underdeveloped financial sectors and 
high inequality hinders the effective allocation of capital, which impedes 
overall economic efficiency.
37
  Thus, defining an economy as “emerging” 
 
Emerging Markets: Developing Countries (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 00/35, 
2000) (discussing the myriad flaws in the taxation systems that affect economic growth in 
developing countries); but see Ajit Singh, Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging 
Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions 7 (G-24 Discussion Paper Series, 
Paper No. 18, 2002) (“[M]any developing countries have been able to maintain considerable 
competition in product markets despite the absence of a formal competition policy.”); 
Prasad, supra note 33, at 3 (noting that the global financial crisis exposed both weaknesses 
in the regulatory structures of advanced economies and strengths of certain regulatory 
systems in emerging markets). 
 34  Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the 
Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 120–23 (1999) (surveying the various theories 
regarding the importance of strong judiciaries to enforce contract and property rights, 
restrain government actors, and otherwise protect foreign investors); see also William Ratliff 
& Edgardo Buscaglia, Judicial Reform: The Neglected Priority in Latin America, 550 
ANNALS AM. ACAD, 59 (1997); Vai-Lam Mui, Contracting in the Shadow of a Corrupt 
Court, 155 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 249 (1999). 
 35  Juan Martinez & Javier Santiso, Financial Markets and Politics: The Confidence 
Game in Latin American Emerging Economies, 24 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 363, 364 (2003) 
(noting the connection between perceived political instability and real instability in financial 
markets in emerging markets). More corruption is an indirect negative consequence of weak 
political institutions.  See Daniel Lederman et al., Accountability and Corruption: Political 
Institutions Matter (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2708, 2001) 
(“[P]olitical institutions affect corruption through two channels: political accountability and 
the structure of provision of public goods.”); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. 
J. ECON. 681 (1995) (showing that corruption lowers economic growth by lowering 
investment); Beata S. Javorcik & Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption and Cross-Border Investment 
in Emerging Markets: Firm-Level Evidence (Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research, 
Working Paper No. 062009, 2009) (showing that corruption lowers FDI and pushes the 
remaining FDI towards joint ventures, which technologically advanced firms disfavor). 
 36  Krishna G. Palepu & Tarun Khanna, Institutional Voids and Policy Challenges in 
Emerging Markets, 5 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 71, 71 (1998); see also Garry D. Bruton et al., 
Institutional Differences and the Development of Entrepreneurial Ventures: A Comparison 
of the Venture Capital Industries in Latin America and Asia, 40 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 762, 771 
(2009) (finding that the different institutional reforms undertaken in Latin America and Asia 
have led to differing levels of entrepreneurship). 
 37  Edda Zoli, Financial Development in Emerging Europe: The Unfinished Agenda 3 
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 07/245, 2007) (“Financial development is often 
associated with improved economic performance, as deep, liquid, diversified, and stable 
financial markets allow efficient intermediation of funds, facilitate risk diversification, and 
tend to favor growth in the long run.  Moreover, strong local markets can offer a stable 
source of financing for private and public sectors, helping them cope with possibly volatile 
external capital flows.”); Jin Zhang et al., Financial Development and Economic Growth: 
Recent Evidence from China, 40 J. COMP. ECON. 393, 393–400 (2012) (reviewing literature 
on the subject of financial development and growth tending to show a positive correlation 
between the two); José Luís Oreiro, Capital Mobility, Real Exchange Rate Appreciation, and 
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goes beyond merely quantifying economic growth.  On the one hand, the 
label suggests that an EME is likely to enjoy a bright economic future and a 
more powerful voice in world economic fora.  On the other hand, the label 
also recognizes long histories of economic failures and areas of uncertainty 
that could impede the EME’s positive trajectory.  Brazil epitomizes this 
uncertainty.  Its long history of economic underperformance, recent 
dramatic reforms, and unrealized potential make it an intriguing example of 
a truly emerging market. 
III. THE PRE-EMERGENT BRAZIL 
The “pre-emergent” Brazil is marked by four periods of economic 
underperformance.  The first period covers Brazil’s post-independence 
economic stagnation in the nineteenth century.  The second was a period of 
high economic growth that commenced in the early twentieth century and 
came to an end with the debt crisis of the early 1980s.  The third was a 
period of economic struggle during Latin America’s “lost decade.”  The 
fourth period included significant economic reforms that set the stage for 
Brazil’s elevation to an EME. 
A.  Post-Independence Brazil 
Unlike its Spanish-American peers, Brazil did not gain its 
independence from Portugal through an armed revolution, but rather by 
becoming a separate empire headed by a member of the Portuguese royal 
family.
38
  Though this process prevented Brazil from fracturing into smaller 
 
Asset Price Bubbles in Emerging Economies: A Post Keynesian Macroeconomic Model for a 
Small Open Economy, 28 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 317, 319 (2005) (“[F]inancial markets in 
emerging countries . . . have a low degree of organization, which produces a great volatility 
in asset prices when compared to the fluctuations in asset prices observed in the financial 
markets of developed countries.”); Peter J. Morgan & Mario B. Lamberte, Strengthening 
Financial Infrastructure (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 345, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006983.  Emerging market financial systems have, however, been 
generally less affected by the global financial crisis than those in advanced economies.  
Prasad, supra note 33, at 4.  Inequality among a country’s population hinders overall 
economic potential by encouraging inefficient allocation of credit.  Lending institutions view 
the very poor as credit risks, and thus do not lend to them except by charging higher interest 
rates or requiring collateral as security for loans.  These requirements work to prevent many 
of a nation’s poor from gaining access to credit or force them to use that credit more 
restrictively to ensure their ability to repay, both of which prevent the credit from being used 
as productively as it would be otherwise.  If a whole segment of the population is not fully 
participating in the economy, the economy does not function at maximum capacity or 
efficiency.  FRANCISCO H.G. FERREIRA ET AL., INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
BRAZIL xvii (2004). 
 38  RIORDAN ROETT, THE NEW BRAZIL 15 (2010).  The Portuguese royal family fled to 
Brazil in 1807 after Napoleon invaded the Iberian Peninsula.  Dom Pedro I decided to stay in 
Brazil and rule it as a separate empire after the rest of the family returned to Portugal.  The 
arrival of the monarchy is when Brazil first opened to international trade with Portugal’s 
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states as the former Spanish colonies did, it also prevented any real societal 
or economic change from occurring.
39
  The country and its economy 
continued to be dominated by the land-owning class propelled by the free 
labor of African slaves that had dominated during the colonial period.
40
  In 
1822, just prior to the establishment of the new empire, Brazil had the 
lowest GDP per capita of any New World colony and depended largely on 
sugar and cotton exports.
41
  By the time the empire ended at the end of the 
nineteenth century, coffee had supplanted sugar and cotton as the country’s 
principal export, industrialization was still far off, and the new government 
was responsible for a sizeable debt left to it by the empire.
42
 
The monarchy outlawed slavery in 1888, and the country peacefully 
transitioned to a republic the following year.
43
  The “First Republic” (1889–
1930) was a decentralized government in which the states had expansive 
powers.
44
  The central government did, however, play a key role in 
supporting the coffee boom in São Paulo that drove the national economy.
45
  
The First Republic also saw the rise of “Ordem e Progresso” (Order and 
Progress) as a national mantra that sought “modernization,” mostly through 
militarization.
46
  It was the newly strengthened military, not surprisingly, 
that brought about the end of the First Republic.
47
  When the political 
climate stagnated during the first quarter of the twentieth century, it was 
young military officers who first challenged the old politics of the ruling 
 
allies, especially Britain.  Id. at 24–25. 
 39  Id. at 19. 
 40  Id. at 21–22. 
 41  John H. Coatsworth, Why is Brazil “Underdeveloped” and What Can Be Done About 
It?, 6 HARV. REV. LATIN AM. 7, 7 (2007); ROETT, supra note 38, at 29. 
 42  ROETT, supra note 38, at 28, 32.  Coffee’s ascension was largely aided by British 
capital and engineers who built the railroads to connect the coffee producing regions to the 
port at Santos.  Id. at 28. 
 43  Id. at 15.  The desire to be an influential nation drove much of the debate regarding 
slavery prior to its abolishment.  Abolitionists feared that Brazil could not become a 
powerful, modern nation if it was the last country to abolish slavery, while the pro-slavery 
politicians argued that Brazil could not become a global power unless it was perceived as a 
white nation.  The country eventually settled on a compromise: slavery was abolished and 
European immigrants were recruited to serve as cheap labor and reinforce the white 
population.  Id. at 28–29. 
 44  Id. at 15.  Decentralization came about due to the growing influence of the Sao Paolo 
state (the home of the coffee boom) that felt oppressed by the Rio de Janeiro based central 
government.  Id. at 29.  The states’ powers at this time included taxation of exports and the 
creation of separate militaries.  Id. at 32. 
 45  Id. at 15.  Though coffee drove the economy, Roett argues that coffee’s success 
restricted growth in other sectors as it attracted such a large percentage of total investment.  
Id. at 35. 
 46  Id. at 30.  “Ordem e Progresso” is still emblazoned on the Brazilian flag today. 
 47  ROETT, supra note 38, at 36. 
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elite in both the military and civilian world.
48
  The movement started by 
those young officers came to a head in 1930 when a democratically-elected 
president was forced out of office in favor of the man who had been runner 
up in the election—former finance minister Getúlio Vargas.
49
 
B.  Early Twentieth Century to the Debt Crisis of the 1980s 
Though the Brazilian economy experienced its first stretch of sustained 
growth in the last years of the First Republic, it was under Getúlio Vargas 
that the Brazilian economy began to modernize.
50
  Under Vargas, the focus 
of Brazil’s economic policies was achieving self-sufficiency and economic 
independence through state-led development initiatives.
51
  To support his 
efforts and dilute the influence of the agricultural oligarchs, Vargas 
immediately sought the support of urban labor, the burgeoning middle 
class, and the Roman Catholic Church.
52
  Though in the broadest sense his 
outreach to these groups was political, his specific policies would help 
foster economic development in the future.
53
  Indeed, Brazil averaged four 
percent growth annually throughout the 1930s while most of the developed 
world was mired in the Great Depression.
54
  In 1937, Vargas consolidated 
his reforms after a self-coup of sorts allowed him to retain executive power 
despite a constitutional limit to one term as president.
55
  Vargas branded the 
new political reality the “Estado Novo” (“New State”).
56
 
After announcing the “New State,” Vargas strengthened his drive for 
industrialization by focusing state investment in the steel and oil sectors—
 
 48  Id. at 35–36. 
 49  Id.  Getúlio Vargas was the first Brazilian leader that was not part of the “agrarian 
aristocracy” that had ruled Brazil during the entire First Republic.  He ruled Brazil for 
eighteen years in various capacities that Roett labels “provisional president” (1930–1934), 
“indirectly elected chief executive” (1934–1937), “soft dictator” (1937–1945), and directly 
elected president (1951–1954).  Id. at 37. 
 50  See Coatsworth, supra note 41, at 7 (noting that from 1913 to 1980, Brazil grew faster 
than any other country in the Western Hemisphere). 
 51  Leonardo Martinez-Diaz & Lael Brainard, Brazil: The “B” Belongs in the BRICs, in 
BRAZIL AS AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER? 5 (Leonardo Martinez-Diaz & Lael Brainard eds., 
2009). 
 52  ROETT, supra note 38, at 38–39. 
 53  Id. at 38.  For example, education was a large focus of Vargas’ outreach to the middle 
class whose loyalty he hoped to win.  He opened the first Brazilian university in São Paulo in 
1934 mainly in the hopes of educating the next generation of public administrators, but also 
to ensure professional opportunities existed for the middle class to prevent members from 
falling to a lower class.  Id. at 38–39. 
 54  GORDON, supra note 17, at 14. 
 55  ROETT, supra note 38, at 38.  Vargas himself had approved the 1934 constitution that 
limited him to one term that would have ended in 1938.  Id. at 39. 
 56  Id. at 41. 
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the first vestiges of import substitution in heavy industry.
57
  Despite these 
efforts, Brazil’s economy was still largely dependent on coffee, and 
industrialization was slow.
58
  Like with his predecessor, the military 
peacefully pushed Vargas out of power in 1945 due to his overzealous 
attempts to further consolidate power.
59
  Despite the political backlash, the 
new government did little to change Brazil’s economic course.
60
  Though 
Brazil’s GDP grew at an average of six percent per year between 1947 and 
1962, the government often employed unorthodox economic policies.
61
  
The country struggled with balance-of-payment issues for several years 
leading the government to impose exchange rate controls from 1947 to 
1953 to help depress an over-valued currency, and to introduce import 
licensing requirements to stem the flow of imports.
62
  Though it was Vargas 
who first pushed for import substitution, especially during his final term as 
president in the early 1950s, it was his successor, Juscelino Kubitschek 
(1956–1961), who made import substitution the cornerstone of an economic 




Despite credit often going to either Vargas or Kubitschek, the Banco 
 
 57  Id.; GORDON, supra note 17, at 41.  Policies that fit the import substitution mold date 
to the nineteenth century, but early import substitution was focused on simpler consumer 
goods.  ROETT, supra note 38, at 41.  Brazil’s first forays into import substitution also had 
more to do with achieving balance-of-payments equilibrium than industrialization.  Werner 
Baer & Issac Kerstenetzky, Import Substitution and Industrialization in Brazil, 54 AM. 
ECON. REV. 411, 413–14 (1964).  Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was an 
immensely popular policy throughout Latin America from the 1950s to the 1970s.  Argentine 
economist Raul Prebisch developed the policy during his time with the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, now ECLAC).  The literature on import 
substitution is vast.  See, e.g., ANN O. KRUEGER, TRADE POLICIES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS 
(1995); Albert O. Hirschman, The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization 
in Latin America, 82 Q. J. ECON. 1 (1968); RAUL PREBISCH, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
OF LATIN AMERICA AND ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS (1950); Werner Baer, Import Substitution 
and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations, 7 LATIN AM. RES. 
REV. 95 (1972); Henry J. Bruton, A Reconsideration of Import Substitution, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 
903 (1998).  Vargas’ decision to invest in steel was driven mostly by the high war-time 
demand and the financial assistance the United States provided in return for Brazil’s military 
assistance to the Allied Forces.  In 1938, Vargas nationalized all oil production, sparking 
years of debate surrounding the government’s proper role in the sector.  ROETT supra note 
38, at 41–42. 
 58  ROETT, supra note 38, at 42.  In 1940, Brazil’s infrastructure was still sub-par and 
two-thirds of adults were illiterate—both of which inhibited Brazil’s economic development.  
GORDON, supra note 17, at 14. 
 59  ROETT, supra note 38, at 43. 
 60  Id. at 44. 
 61  Martinez-Diaz & Brainard, supra note 51, at 2; ROETT, supra note 38, at 45. 
 62  ROETT, supra note 38, at 45.  The over-valued currency was of special concern to the 
export-driven economy.  Id. 
 63  GORDON, supra note 17, at 41; ROETT, supra note 38, at 48. 
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do Brasil was actually the first source of import substitution policies 
specifically targeted at industrialization.
64
  It issued a decree in 1955 that 
allowed entrepreneurs easy access to foreign capital if the government 
deemed their proposed investments desirable for Brazil’s development.
65
  In 
addition, Brazil changed its “Law of Similars” to make it easier for 
domestic producers to successfully apply for tariff protection against 
foreign competition.
66
  The government also directly supported various 
industries.
67
  During Kubitschek’s term, the government invested heavily in 
the automotive, shipbuilding, and petrochemical industries as part of his 
“Programa de Metas” (“Goals Program”).
68
  These import substitution 
policies helped Brazil develop rapidly.
69
  However, while the automotive 
industry grew to be very successful, other government-targeted industries 
saw mixed results.
70
  Moreover, import substitution gave rise to two 




 64  Baer & Kerstenetzky, supra note 57, at 414.  Banco do Brasil is a state-owned 
commercial bank that acted as a quasi-central bank until the government created an official 
central bank (Banco Central do Brasil) in 1964.  Histórico,  BANCO CENTRAL DO BRAZIL,  
http://www.bc.gov.br/?HISTORIABC (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). 
 65  Baer & Kerstenetzky, supra note 57, at 414. 
 66  Id.  Any manufacturer that produced or intended to produce a good similar to one that 
was currently imported could apply for tariff protections starting early in the twentieth 
century.  The change in the 1950s made any granted protections much stronger by raising 
tariffs and exchange rate requirements.  Id. 
 67  Id.  Much of this government money went through the newly established Brazilian 
Development Bank (known by its Portuguese acronym, BNDES) and state-run enterprises.  
Id. 
 68  GORDON, supra note 17, at 42. 
 69  From 1947 to 1952, Brazil’s economy grew at an average rate of six percent per year.  
By the end of Kubitschek’s presidency, growth had reached nearly eight percent per year. 
Industrialization continued as Brazil began to produce more consumer durable goods and 
capital goods.  Rural to urban migration also nearly doubled.  ROETT, supra note 38, at 48; 
GORDON, supra note 17, at 16.  There is some debate as to the effects of ISI on export 
diversity.  Gordon argues that ISI did help diversify exports, while Kerstenetzky argues that 
any export diversification was minimal.  GORDON, supra note 17, at 43; Baer & Kerstenetzky 
supra note 57, at 424.  Both agree that agriculture was almost completely ignored during the 
period, which, due to its historical domination of Brazilian exports, essentially guaranteed a 
certain amount of export diversification.  GORDON, supra note 17, at 43; Baer & 
Kerstenetzky, supra note 57, at 424. 
 70  GORDON, supra note 17, at 41–43; Baer & Kerstenetzky, supra note 57, at 421.  The 
automotive industry was successful not only because it eventually manufactured cars at 
globally competitive prices, but also because it spawned an entire network of related 
economic activity as automobiles that became a popular consumer item for middle-class 
Brazilians.  Service stations, roadside motels, technical schools, and other business sprang up 
throughout the country supporting both new consumption and new jobs.  GORDON, supra 
note 17, at 41–42. 
 71  GORDON, supra note 17, at 43; BAER, supra note 18, at 67–68.  Though Brazil 
eventually conquered high inflation, as discussed infra Part III.D, regional inequality is an 
issue to this day.  See, e.g., Carlos Alberto Manso et al., Retornos da Educação e o 
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The structuralist economic theorists who developed the idea of import 
substitution industrialization believed that inflation was a necessary 
component of rapid growth.
72
  This belief allowed policy makers to 
continuously maintain a loose monetary policy while building large deficits 
by spending on large projects and increasing the minimum wage faster than 
was necessary to keep up with the cost of living.
73
  Brazil’s excellent 
growth during the Kubitschek years served as proof of the wisdom of 
structuralist economics, but only temporarily.
74
 
Brazil’s short-lived democratic stability came to an end with the 
election of Jânio Quadros in 1960.
75
  Quadros resigned from office in 
August of 1961 after only eight months following several unsuccessful 
attempts to expand executive power.
76
  The military, however, refused to 
allow his vice president João Goulart to return from a diplomatic visit to 
China to assume the presidency due to fears that Goulart held socialist 
economic views.
77
  After several weeks of tension and political 
maneuvering, the military allowed Goulart to return to Brazil and assume 
the presidency with reduced executive powers.
78
  The conflict sapped the 
government’s legitimacy, weakened institutional stability, and halted the 
country’s economic growth
79
—all of which opened the door for another 
military takeover in early 1964.
80
 
The ensuing military regime’s economic policies sought to control 
inflation (which had become an obvious problem during the first years of 
the 1960s) by increasing savings via reforming capital markets, attracting 
foreign capital to finance large-scale industrial production, and investing 
heavily in infrastructure and state-owned enterprises (parastatals).
81
  The 
military government’s first policy actions focused on reducing wasteful 
 
Desequilíbrio Regional no Brasil, 64 REV. BRASILEIRA DE ECONOMIA 115 (2010). 
 72  GORDON, supra note 17, at 44–50. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id.  Though the wisdom of structuralist economics was at least debatable for the next 
two decades, structuralism was almost completely discredited as an economic theory 
following the debt crisis.  See Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Development Economics and the 
World Bank’s Identity Crisis, 2 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 211 (1995). 
 75  ROETT, supra note 38, at 50. 
 76  Id.; see also GORDON, supra note 17, at 53–54 (discussing the possible political 
reasons behind Quadros’ abrupt resignation). 
 77  GORDON, supra note 17, at 51. 
 78  Id. 
 79  BAER, supra note 18, at 71–72.  After peaking at 10.3% growth in 1961, economic 
growth “fell to 5.3%, 1.5%, and 2.4% in 1962, 1963, and 1964, respectively.”  Id. at 72.  
Meanwhile, inflation reached 100% in 1964.  Id. 
 80  GORDON, supra note 17, at 52–53. 
 81  BAER, supra note 18, at 73; Anthony Galano III, International Monetary Fund 
Response to the Brazilian Debt Crisis: Whether the Effects of Conditionality Have 
Undermined Brazil’s National Sovereignty?, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV. 323, 325–26 (1994). 
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spending, increasing tax collection, and removing some price restrictions—
all of which were generally successful.
82
  The budget deficit steadily fell 
from 4.3% of GDP in 1963 to 0.3% in 1971, and inflation fell to about 
20%.
83
  These adjustments set the stage for the so-called “Brazilian 
Miracle,” lasting from 1968 to 1973, when the country’s economy grew 
more than ten percent each year.
84  
Changes to capital market regulations 
increased investment, which the government then directed towards specific 
industries through tax incentives.
85
  These policies helped dramatically 
diversify the country’s exports.
86
 
Some observers argue that state control of the economy through the tax 
code and parastatals contributed more to the Miracle than market forces 
did.
87
  However, the Miracle had a very troublesome side effect: income 




C.  Brazil’s Debt Crisis of the 1980s 
The military government’s drive to industrialize Brazil led the country 
to spend vast amounts of borrowed money on the infrastructure necessary to 
support industrial production.
89
  This increased borrowing coincided with 
the return of import substitution policies in the second half of the 1970s 
aimed at increasing domestic production of steel, copper, aluminum, 
fertilizers, and capital goods while simultaneously continuing the drive to 
 
 82  BAER, supra note 18, at 73. 
 83  Id. at 73–74. 
 84  Martinez-Diaz & Brainard, supra note 51, at 2; BAER, supra note 18, at 74.  Foreign 
direct investment also skyrocketed from $84 million per year from 1965–1969 to $1 billion 
per year from 1973–1976.  BAER supra note 18, at 77.  Note, however, that this period was 
also the high point for human rights abuses during the military dictatorship.  Id. at 88. 
 85  BAER, supra note 18, at 74. 
 86  Id. at 77.  Coffee—traditionally Brazil’s staple export—saw its percentage of total 
export volume fall from 42% in the mid-1960’s to 12.6% in 1974, while manufactures rose 
from around 7% to 27%.  Id. 
 87  Id. at 78. 
 88  GORDON, supra note 17, at 21.  Brazil’s inequality grabbed global attention in the mid-
1970’s when World Bank President Robert McNamara singled the country out as an 
example of an economically-prosperous developing country that was doing little to help the 
majority of its populace.  BAER, supra note 18, at 88. 
 89  Galano, supra note 81, at 325.  Though this borrowing is unanimously accepted as the 
main cause of the 1982 Brazilian debt default, some authors argue that this spending created 
the current competitive advantage Brazil holds in agribusiness and biofuel production. 
Martinez-Diaz & Brainard, supra note 51, at 6.  The parastatals alone would come to account 
for 46% of Brazil’s total foreign debt in 1981.  Galano argues that Brazil relied on foreign 
lending instead of opening its industries to foreign direct investment because the military 
was fearful of the potential of foreign economic influence that could come with FDI.  
Galano, supra note 81, at 326. 
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  When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) raised oil prices in 1973 and 1979, Brazil had to double 
the amount it spent on imported oil (80% of all oil it consumed)—money it 
borrowed at floating interest rates from foreign (mostly U.S.) commercial 
banks flush with petrodollar deposits from OPEC countries.
91
  Brazil’s 
government justified relying on debt to finance its growth by claiming that 
the new export capacity would lead to a trade surplus that would in turn 
increase the amount of foreign reserves available to a level easily sufficient 
to repay creditors in the long run.
92
 
From 1978 to 1981, the United States compounded Brazil’s budget 
issues by raising interest rates, which increased debt service payments for 
Brazil and several other Latin American countries.
93
  In 1982, Mexico 
defaulted on its foreign debts, instantly drying up foreign sources of capital 
for many Latin American countries, including Brazil.
94
  With no access to 
foreign capital, Brazil was unable to pay its debts and continue spending on 
its industrialization program.
95
  In 1983, it had no other choice but to 
undergo a substantial external debt restructuring and turn to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
96
—a lender Brazil had long avoided 




 90  BAER, supra note 18, at 88–90.  These goals were part of the Second National 
Development Plan. Most of the plan involved expanding the activities of parastatals.  
Though the increased spending was a direct cause of the debt crisis, the policies were at least 
successful at keeping growth rates around seven percent per year for the rest of the 1970s.  
Id. at 90. 
 91  Galano, supra note 81, at 328; BAER, supra note 18, at 87.  Brazil’s import bill for 
petroleum rose from $6.2 billion in 1973 to $12.6 billion in 1974, and  the military 
government—which changed leaders in 1974—made a conscious decision to spend the 
additional money to ensure the rapid growth would continue.  BAER, supra note 18, at 87.  
Baer also notes that the floating interest rates were initially very low, which made it easier to 
rationalize the borrowing.  Id.  Martinez-Diaz and Brainard note that this oil shock pushed 
Brazil to invest heavily in energy independence, the result being that Brazil now derives 
46% of its energy from renewable sources as compared to an average of just 6% in OECD 
countries.  Martinez-Diaz & Brainard, supra note 51, at 7–8. 
 92  BAER, supra note 18, at 90. 
 93  Id. at 93; Galano, supra note 81, at 328.  Brazil compounded its problems by ending 
some export subsidies, thereby exposing the overvaluation of the currency. which the 
government subsequently devalued gradually.  BAER, supra note 18, at 93. 
 94  Galano, supra note 81, at 329; BAER, supra note 18, at 100. 
 95  Galano, supra note 81, at 329; BAER, supra note 18, at 100. 
 96  The IMF “is an organization of 188 countries, working to foster global monetary 
cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high 
employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.”  
About the IMF, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm (last visited 
July 8, 2012). 
 97  Galano, supra note 81, at 329; BAER, supra note 18, at 101.  On the debt crisis, see 
generally Enrique R. Carrasco, The 1980s: The Debt Crisis & The Lost Decade, U. IOWA 
CENTER FOR INT’L FIN. & DEV. E-BOOK, http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/uicifd-ebook/part-
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The IMF held vast power over Brazil.
98
  As conditions to receiving 
IMF loans, Brazil was forced to devalue its currency, cut public spending, 
freeze all wages, reduce the level of subsidized credit available, raise taxes, 
and cut the amount of foreign borrowing by state-owned enterprises.
99
  
After beginning to implement these reforms in 1983, Brazil’s GDP fell four 




In 1985, the military regime handed power to a civilian government 
led by José Sarney, whose main economic task was to control inflation.
101
  
Though the economic regime the IMF imposed on Brazil in 1982 had 
successfully lowered Brazil’s budget deficit and restored growth by 1984,
102
 
it did nothing to control inflation; indeed, inflation quadrupled from 1982 to 
1986.
103
  In the hope of curbing inflation as quickly as possible, Sarney 
introduced the “Cruzado Plan” in early 1986.
104
  The plan introduced a new 
currency (the cruzado) and froze prices and exchange rates after de-
indexing the economy (prices were no longer pegged to the rate of 
inflation).
105
  Though originally successful, the Cruzado Plan had unraveled 
by February 1987, and inflation returned as strong as ever.
106
  By the time 




D.  Brazil in the 1990s 
The 1990s was a critical decade of reform that set the stage for Brazil’s 
phenomenal growth in recent years.  In 1990, Fernando Collor de Mello 
became the first democratically-elected president of Brazil in nearly thirty 
 
1-v-1980s-debt-crisis-lost-decade (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). 
 98  Galano, supra note 81, at 337. 
 99  Id. at 339–40; BAER, supra note 18, at 101. 
 100 Galano, supra note 81, at 340. 
 101 ALBERT FISHLOW, STARTING OVER: BRAZIL SINCE 1985, 34 (2011). 
 102 BAER, supra note 18, at 102. GDP growth reached 4.5% in 1984 and 8.3% in 1985.  
Id. 
 103 FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 34. 
 104 Id. at 36. 
 105 Id.  Sarney looked to Argentina’s and Israel’s experiences to develop this heterodox 
shock plan.  Id. 
 106 Id. at 38.  The Cruzado Plan’s initial success was ultimately the cause of its failure.  
After the plan was announced, real money held by businesses and individuals soared, which 
helped spur consumption and increase imports.  Real wages increased along with 
government spending and overall demand.  External factors also drove demand: lower 
international interest rates, falling oil prices, and a devalued dollar.  This rapid increase in 
demand is what brought inflation back to life, though only after Sarney and his party won an 
enormous majority in the 1986 elections that took place after real wages had risen but while 
inflation was still low.  Id. at 36–38. 
 107 Id. at 39. 
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  His main economic policy goals were price stabilization, 
privatization, and increasing market competition.
109
  He quickly adopted a 
liberal international trade regime by lowering barriers to imports and 
privatizing many state-owned businesses
110
—the first of a decade of reform 
that set the stage for Brazil’s current growth.
111
  His policies, however, were 
not effective at containing inflation, which continued to be a problem until 
1994
112
 when Collor’s successor Itamar Franco announced the “Real Plan” 




The Real Plan was more comprehensive than any of its 
predecessors.
114
  The Plan introduced a new currency (the real), de-indexed 
the economy, tightened monetary policy, introduced a managed-float 
exchange rate system, cut spending, and increased taxes.
115
  There were also 
provisions in the Plan to lower tariff barriers for foreign importers whose 
competition, in theory, would prevent Brazilian monopolies and oligopolies 
from unilaterally raising prices.
116
  Tariffs ultimately fell from an average of 
fifty-one percent in 1988 to fourteen percent in 1994.
117
 
The launch of the Real Plan was the first time Brazil showed the 
economic discipline necessary to attract the foreign capital investments that 
 
 108  GORDON, supra note 17, at 30. 
 109  Id. 
 110  See José Luis de Salles Freire & José Emilio Nunes Pinto, Privatization in Brazil, 17 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 689 (1993).  Between 1991 and 2001, the Brazilian 
government sold $110 billion worth of assets to become “privitaziation’s poster child.”  
Nevertheless, thirteen of Brazil’s one hundred largest firms are still state-owned to this day, 
including the largest—Petrobras, the behemoth state-controlled oil company.  Martinez-Diaz 
& Brainard, supra note 51, at 6. 
 111  Juan de Onis, Brazil’s Big Moment: A South American Giant Wakes Up, 87 FOREIGN 
AFF. 110, 117–18 (2008). 
 112  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 40–41.  Collor tried to contain inflation with his own 
plan, which involved a new currency and a freeze on prices and wages, but his plan failed 
just as its predecessors had.  Id. 
 113  See generally id. at 41–44.  Collor was impeached in 1992 on charges of corruption, 
but resigned before the Brazilian Senate could hold a trial.  GORDON, supra note 17, at 30. 
 114  BAER, supra note 18, at 200.  The biggest difference was that the Real Plan included a 
fiscal restraint component—the “immediate action plan.”  Introduced in 1993, the immediate 
action plan included a $6 billion cut in spending (9% of federal spending), improved tax 
collection, and forced the state governments to repay loan arrears to get new loan guarantees.  
Id. 
 115  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 41–44; BAER, supra note 18, at 200; Benedict Clements, 
The Real Plan, Poverty, and Income Distribution in Brazil, 1997 FIN. & DEV. 44, 44–45 
(1997). 
 116  William C Gruben & John H. Welch, Banking and Currency Crisis Recovery: 
Brazil’s Turnaround of 1999, ECON. & FIN. POL’Y REV., no. Q IV, 2001, at 12, 13. 
 117  Id.; BAER, supra note 18, at 204 (noting that tariffs fell from 32.2% in 1990 to 14.2% 
in 1994). 
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have propelled Brazil’s growth.
118
  Inflation fell from just over fifty percent 
in June 1994 to less than one percent in September 1994.
119
  Lower inflation 
has the practical effect of raising real wages by reducing prices, which in 
turn increases the buying power of wage earners and effectively reduces 
poverty.
120
  Not surprisingly, the Plan pleased the vast majority of 




In his first term in office, Cardoso continued the privatization process 
started by President Collor, stabilized a weak banking sector, and started a 
conditional income transfer program to help the poor.
122
  Though the Real 
Plan is widely considered a success, and President Cardoso is credited with 
stabilizing the Brazilian economy, he failed to properly address the 
country’s ever-growing fiscal deficit.
123
  Concerns over the sustainability of 
its debt began to arise just as the developing world experienced a series of 
financial crises.
124
  Brazil was not immune from the contagion of the Asian 
financial crisis of the late 1990s, when speculators bet against the currencies 
of several countries, successfully forcing those countries to devalue their 
respective currencies.
125
  Brazil’s currency came under attack in 1997 due 
to fears related to the country’s large debt.
126
  Capital inflows fell 
dramatically, followed by renewed capital flight after the 1998 Russian 
bond default.
127
  The Russian crisis pushed investors to become wary of 
EMEs with high debt levels—including Brazil, where it is likely that 
investors had consistently overlooked high fiscal deficits due to the allure of 
high interest rates.
128
  To stave off speculation and prevent capital outflows, 
Brazil raised its already-high interest rates, making speculation less 




 118  STRATFOR, Ignore Brazil’s Election, Here Are The Real Problems Facing The 
Country, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 5, 2010, 8:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/brazil-
geopolitical-situations-2010-10#ixzz1EFD17U2r. 
 119  BAER, supra note 18, at 201.  Though inflation went up some throughout the next 
year, it never went above 5.15% in 1995.  Id. 
 120  Id. at 203–04, 254.  Not surprisingly, consumption rose 16.3% in the first year 
following the introduction of the Real Plan.  Id. at 203. 
 121  De Onis, supra note 111, at 118. 
 122  Id.; BAER, supra note 18, at 211. 
 123  Gruben, supra note 116, at 14; BAER, supra note 18, at 205; FISHLOW, supra note 
101, at 45. 
 124  Gruben, supra note 116, at 14. 
 125  Id. at 14–15.  Markets also exerted some pressure on the real during the 1994–95 
Mexican crisis, but the pressure quickly faded after Brazil devalued the real slightly in the 
first half of 1995.  BAER, supra note 18, at 204–05. 
 126  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 46. 
 127  Id. at 46–47. 
 128  BAER, supra note 18, at 210–11. 
 129  Gruben, supra note 116, at 13–14; FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 46. 
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The hike in interest rates caused domestic industrial production to fall, 
which decreased Brazil’s exports.
130
  Therefore, to pay for necessary 
imports, Brazil had to borrow and increase its debt even further.
131
  The 
increased indebtedness, combined with President Cardoso’s inability to 
convince the Brazilian Congress to pass fiscal restraint legislation, once 
again attracted the attention of currency speculators.
132
  Brazil then received 
a $41.5 billion loan from the IMF, the World Bank, and the United States to 
help it defend against speculators.
133
  The loan, of course, came with 
conditionality.
134
  Within one month of receiving the loan, the Brazilian 
Congress had approved about sixty percent of the required reform measures 
before reaching an impasse on pension reform.
135
  Pressure on the real had 
been easing steadily as Congress instituted the reforms, but capital outflows 
accelerated immediately following the pension-reform failure.
136
  The fatal 
blow, however, did not come from foreign currency speculators, but rather 
from former president and  then-governor of the state of Minas Gerais 
Itamar Franco, who announced that the state would no longer repay its 
debts to the federal government.
137
  Capital outflows skyrocketed from 
already high levels, forcing Brazil to devalue the real by nine percent and 
eventually allowing it to float freely on international markets.
138
 
The crisis, however, did not cause a long-lasting disruption of the flow 
of foreign capital into Brazil.
139
  Cardoso’s macroeconomic policies had 
proven to be successful—public sector revenues were rising, which gave 
Brazil more money to pay its debts, privatization had reduced the losses 
borne by the state, and increased agricultural production kept food prices 
stable—all of which helped blunt the effect of the crisis.
140
  Banking 
reforms had forced banks to keep more cash on hand by lowering 
acceptable leverage rates, ensuring that banks had sufficient capital to pay 
fleeing investors without causing banks to fail or creating risk to the entire 
 
 130  Gruben, supra note 116, at 15. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. at 13–15. 
 133  Id.; BAER, supra note 18, at 216. 
 134  BAER, supra note 18, at 216. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. 
 137  Id.; Gruben, supra note 116, at 15. 
 138  Gruben, supra note 116, at 15.  The IMF has since admitted that it should have 
encouraged Brazil to give up its crawling peg exchange rate system earlier, a move the IMF 
did not take due to lack of internal agreement.  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 46–47. 
 139  De Onis, supra note 28, at 111.  Indeed, many observers predicted a near total 
collapse of the Brazilian economy with the return of double-digit inflation and a six percent 
decrease in real income.  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 47. 
 140  De Onis, supra note 28, at 112. 
  






The crisis quickly subsided and the real stabilized.
142
  Cardoso was 
able to finish his second term by capping discretionary spending and raising 
tax revenues—both of which helped address the longstanding issue of ever-
rising debt, but failed to bring the dramatic change necessary to put Brazil’s 
debt problems in the past.
143
  Cardoso was constitutionally barred from 




IV. BRAZIL EMERGES 
It has only been within the last few years that Brazil has began to reap 
the benefits of nearly two decades of reform.  Brazil’s strong performance 
through the global financial crisis highlighted Brazil’s newfound stability.  
Much of the reason for this strong performance can be traced to a series of 
specific policy decisions that have attacked glaring issues hindering 
economic growth.  Brazil has improved its infrastructure, eased the 
demands of burdensome regulatory schemes, and reformed its judiciary 
with the goal of speeding the judicial process.  All of those changes 
encouraged and facilitated the foreign and domestic investment that has 
propelled Brazil’s economy and set the stage for continued growth in the 
future. 
A.  Lula’s Presidency and the Global Financial Crisis 
It was under Lula that Brazil joined the ranks of emerging economies.  
Though his politics were generally left-of-center, Lula sought to appease 
foreign investors during his campaign by promising to honor contracts, 
protect private property, assert fiscal discipline, and pay off debts.
145
  Once 
in office, he eliminated nearly all concerns by following the orthodox 
economic path of his predecessor.
146
  He also gave the Central Bank greater 
operational autonomy, thereby promoting the development of policies that 
 
 141  Gruben, supra note 116, at 19–21. 
 142  Id. 
 143  See De Onis, supra note 28, at 114.  The Law of Fiscal Responsibility was passed in 
May 2000 to comply with the IMF’s demands.  The law eliminated public sector deficits and 
restricted the government’s ability to incur future debt.  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 47. 
 144  De Onis, supra note 111, at 118. 
 145  Id.  Lula’s campaign itself did not convince international markets that he supported 
orthodox economic policies.  In the months leading up to his widely-anticipated election, 
foreign inflows became shorter-term and the country’s base interest rate rose 300 basis 
points after Lula came in first place in the first election round.  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 
50. 
 146  Id. at 119.  Indeed, Lula’s policies were so orthodox that some referred to his first 
term as “Cardoso’s third term.”  ROETT, supra note 38, at 111. 
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furthered economic growth instead of political interests.
147
  Interest rates 
fell to six percent (Cardoso had lowered them from twenty percent to ten 
percent despite having to raise them during the Real Crisis), which made it 
cheaper for Brazilians to borrow money to expand businesses inside and 
outside Brazil.
148
  He also fostered greater ties with other developing 
countries to help decrease Brazil’s dependence on the developed world as a 
source of consumers for Brazilian products.
149
 
Like his predecessors, Lula faced a financial crisis when the 2008 U.S. 
financial crisis spread globally.  However, the crisis was short-lived for 
Brazil.  Brazil’s GDP shrank slightly in 2009 before returning to booming 
growth in 2010, while the U.S. economy was still barely growing in 
2011.
150
  So why did Brazil handle the crisis so well? 
Brazil’s strong performance through the global financial crisis is 
partially attributable to Brazilian banks’ low exposure to the U.S. mortgage-
backed securities market.
151
  Thanks to President Cardoso’s reforms, 
Brazil’s banks were unable to expose themselves to as much risk as other 
banks around the globe.
152
  Brazil’s banking sector also benefited from 
having one central regulator—the Central Bank.
153
  Some observers argue 
that having one regulator supervise every aspect of a nation’s banking 
activities is more efficient and effective than systems with multiple 
regulators responsible for supervising different aspects of the banking 
sector, as in the United States.
154
  Taken in combination, these policies 
prevented Brazilian banks from suffering losses so substantial as to require 
large bailouts to stay afloat, unlike their U.S. counterparts. 
Brazil also benefited from low unemployment and less dependence on 
trade with the developed world.
155
  Low unemployment and trade ties with 
the developing world meant that Brazil had access to a large number of 
 
 147  Knowledge@Wharton, Lessons from Brazil: Why Is It Bouncing Back While Other 
Markets Stumble?, LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP., Nov. 2009, at 10. 
 148  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 80. 
 149  Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 147. 
 150  GDP Growth (Annual %), supra note 2. 
 151  Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 147, at 11. 
 152  Id. 
 153  The Central Bank played a pivotal role during the crisis, tightening monetary policy 
prior to the Lehman Brothers collapse to limit the inflationary effects of government 
stimulus spending, then took measures to increase liquidity following the Lehman-induced 
credit crunch.  Mário Mesquita & Mário Torós, Brazil and the 2008 Panic, in THE GLOBAL 
CRISIS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 113 (Bank for 
Int’l Settlements, BIS Papers Ser. No. 54, 2010). 
 154  HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 253 (17th ed. 2010); but see Prasad, supra 
note 33, at 5–6 (arguing that the global financial crisis exposed flaws in both the U.K.’s 
single regulator system and the U.S.’s multiple regulator system). 
 155  Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 147, at 11. 
  
Emerging Economies After the Global Financial Crisis 
33:81 (2012) 
105 
consumers to keep demand for Brazilian exports high.
156
  Those increased 
ties were a focal point of Lula’s foreign policy.
157
 It was, therefore, not 
surprising that China overtook the United States as Brazil’s largest trading 
partner in 2009.
158
  Having a diversified profile of consumers made Brazil 
less dependent on demand from the developed world, meaning demand for 




None of this is to say that Brazil went through the crisis completely 
unscathed.  The government did have to provide a stimulus package 
amounting to 1.5% of its GDP to spur the economy,
160
 but that paled in 
comparison to the stimulus packages in Japan (fifteen percent of a much 
larger GDP) and the United States (seven percent of an even larger GDP).
161
  
Brazil’s unemployment rate also rose slightly during the crisis,
162
 but has 




President Lula da Silva’s greatest success may have been his ability to 
increase Brazil’s influence internationally.  He led calls for a greater voice 
for the developing world in the IMF
164
 and to shift the main forum for 
global economic policy discussions from the G-7 to the G-20, which 
includes EMEs such as Brazil.
165
  Both of these calls were successful—the 
 
 156  Id. at 10–11. 
 157  Id. at 11.  In the 1950s, the United States accounted for 41% of Brazil’s exports, but 
by 1997 that number had fallen to 17.7%.  Meanwhile, other Latin American countries saw 
their share of Brazil’s exports rise from 9.7% in 1967 to 26% in 1997.  BAER, supra note 18, 
at 229. 
 158  SECRETARIAT FOR SOCIAL COMMUNICATION, PRESIDENCY OF THE FEDERATIVE 
REPUBLIC OF BRAZ., TRADE BALANCE – BRAZIL-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS 2 (2011), available 
at http://www.brasil.gov.br/para/press/files/fact-sheet-brazil-china-trade.  Brazilian exports 
to China rose from $1,902 million in 2001 to $30,786 million in 2010.  Id.  Imports from 
China rose from $1,328 million to $25,593 million during the same period.  Id. at 6. 
 159  Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 147, at 10–11. 
 160  Id. at 11. 
 161  Amanda Ruggeri, A Look at the World’s Largest Stimulus Packages Outside the 
United States, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 5, 2009), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2009/01/05/a-look-at-the-worlds-largest-stimulus-
plans-outside-the-united-states. 
 162  Andre Soliani & Diana Kinch, Brazil’s Unemployment Rate Rises to a 10-Month 
High, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2009 10:35 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aboxHfYwzfus. 
 163  Record Low Unemployment Rate in Brazil for 2010, MERCOPRESS (Jan. 27, 2011, 
9:01 PM), http://en.mercopress.com/2011/01/27/record-low-unemployment-rate-in-brazil-
for-2010. 
 164  Fabiola Moura, Brazil’s Lula Says World Bank, IMF Both Need Reforms, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2009, 1:28 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awemHfQATQbY. 
 165  Gary Duffy, Brazil Pushes for Bigger G20 Role, BBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2009), 
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IMF recently shifted more voting power to EMEs (including Brazil),
166
 and 
the G-20 became the main global economic forum in 2009.
167
 
B.  Specific Policies that Have Contributed to Brazil’s Emergence 
Several policies have played, and continue to play, an important role in 
Brazil’s status as an EME.  One such policy is Brazil’s emphasis on 
building the infrastructure necessary to support a diverse and thriving 
economy.  No economy will function at its highest capacity if poor 
infrastructure—such as bad roads, insufficient sea ports, lack of 
technology—creates inefficiencies at the various stages of production.
168
  
Brazil has spent much of its new wealth improving infrastructure with the 
aim of facilitating future economic growth.  The most important of such 
projects is the “Growth Acceleration Plan” (known by its Portuguese 
acronym, PAC), authored by current President Dilma Rousseff while she 
 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7963704.stm. 
 166  Press Release, Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Board of Governors Approves Major Quota 
and Governance Reforms (Dec. 16, 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10477.htm.  With the shift, EMEs gained an 
additional six percent of voting power, while an additional six percent of voting power 
shifted from overrepresented countries—both developed and developing—to 
underdeveloped countries.  Id.  The end result is that EMEs have five percent more real 
voting power than they had before the shift, and all four BRIC countries are now among the 
ten largest vote holders.  Id.  Brazil’s voting share increased from 1.402% to 2.218%.  Id. 
 167  G20 to be New Global Economy Coordinator, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2009, 1:40 AM) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/25/us-g20-role-sb-idUSTRE58O0H820090925.  
Brazil has not, however, been successful in its demand for a permanent seat on the U.N. 
Security Council, though the U.K. recently endorsed its campaign.  John Paul Rathbone, UK 
Backs Brazil Bid for UN Security Council Seat, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2010), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6718897e-ec1e-11df-9e11-00144feab49a.html.  This failure 
is due, at least in part, to Brazil’s opposition to sanctions against Iran for continuing to 
pursue a nuclear program, and less so due to any economic failure.  Alexei Barrionuevo & 
Ginger Thompson, Brazil’s Iran Diplomacy Worries U.S. Officials, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 
2010, at A9, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/05/15/world/americas/15lula.html.  Brazil 
has backed away from its support of Iran under President Rousseff. Simon Romero, Iranian 
Adviser Accuses Brazil of Ruining Relations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012, at A10, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/world/americas/ahmadinejad-adviser-accuses-brazil-of-
ruining-relations.html.  For an argument in support of Brazil becoming a permanent member 
of the U.N. Security Council, see David A. Bailey, Pull Up a Seat: Brazil Should Be the Next 
Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, 17 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 83 
(2011). 
 168  For example, according to one recent study, Brazilian businesses alone spend R$17 
billion each year on unnecessary expenses that arise due to the poor condition of roads, 
decay and bureaucracy at ports, a lack of railway capacity, and storage expenses caused by 
unnecessary delays.  Renée Pereira, Infraestrutura precária eleva custo logístico em R$17 
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was a member of Lula’s cabinet.
169
 
The “Growth Acceleration Plan” is an umbrella term for thousands of 
economic development projects across Brazil that began in 2007.
170
  The 
program has several components, but the main goal is to improve the poor 
infrastructure that has created a pattern of social exclusion.
171
  The poor are 
more likely to live in areas with bad roads, poor public transportation, few 
available jobs, limited or no access to credit, and no mail or commercial 
delivery services.
172
  These and other issues prevent the poor from fully 
participating in Brazil’s economy.  PAC seeks to remedy this problem by 
building or rebuilding homes and roads, and improving sanitation, sewage, 
water, and electrical services in the poorest areas of Brazil’s cities.
173
  To 
maximize the program’s impact, the government hires people living in 
those neighborhoods to perform the work.
174
  This feature simultaneously 
creates employment in the short-term in areas where unemployment is 




Regrettably, there are conflicting reports as to whether the projects are 
actually being completed.
176
  President Lula da Silva denied the negative 
reports, but admitted that progress had been slower than he hoped, blaming 
bureaucracy for the delays.
177
  The slow progress did not prevent him from 
 
 169  Gustavo Faleiros, Brazilian President’s Promises Crumble under Weight of Belo 
Monte Dam, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2011, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2011/feb/01/brazil-dilma-rousseff-
hydroelectric-dam. 
 170  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 75; Susan Schaller, Lula’s Growth Acceleration 
Program: The Best that Brazilian Funding Can Buy?, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (June 
5, 2008), http://www.coha.org/lula%E2%80%99s-brazilian-growth-acceleration-program-
the-best-that-government-funding-can-buy/. 
 171  Schaller, supra note 170.  The plan originally called for a $235 billion investment in 
infrastructure improvement.  There were also components meant to address Brazil’s high 
regulatory burden.  See infra text accompanying notes 217–224; FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 
75. 
 172  Schaller, supra note 170. 
 173  Id.  PAC’s focus is not only on social inclusion.  The infrastructure investment is 
separated into three categories, including a category addressing these social needs.  Id.  The 
other two categories are meant to address general road reconstruction, port and airport 
building, and energy production, respectively.  Id.  The social infrastructure accounts for 
$170.8 billion ($34.8 billion from the federal government), general infrastructure $58.3 
billion ($38 billion from the federal government), and energy $274.8 billion (none of which 
came from the federal government).  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 75–76. 
 174  Schaller, supra note 170. 
 175  Id. 
 176  Id. 
 177  See Ihssane Loudiyi, Brazil Announces Phase Two of the Growth Acceleration 
Program, WORLD BANK (Mar. 30, 2010, 9:38 AM), 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/growth/node/8715.  As of the beginning of 2010, only three-fifths 
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announcing an $872 billion extension (PAC II) to the program in March 
2010, when PAC I was only fifty percent completed.
178
  The goal of PAC II 
is to increase the country’s energy production capacity, build two million 
new homes (to cut the estimated housing deficit to three million homes), 
and make infrastructure improvements for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 
Olympics to be held in Brazil, including building a high-speed rail to 
connect Brazil’s two largest cities, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.
179
  Once 
completed, these projects should greatly expand Brazil’s economic potential 
for years to come. 
Brazil has further facilitated its economic ascension by opening itself 
to the world through new international trade and foreign investment 
policies.  Since the mid-1990s, Brazil has consistently lowered its import 
tariffs while modernizing its overall import system (customs inspections, 
payments, etc.), making it cheaper and easier for foreign countries and 
companies to sell their products in Brazil.
180
  Due to these changes, Brazil’s 




The amount of foreign direct investment flowing into Brazil has 
steadily increased since President Cardoso introduced the Real Plan in 
1994
182
 thanks, in part, to the high investment returns associated with fast 
growth and high interest rates.
183
  Brazil’s policies have played a role as 
well.  To begin, a national treatment standard ensures that foreign and 
domestic investors are treated equally.
184
  Unlike many countries, Brazil 
does not set a maximum or minimum level for foreign investments, it 
allows foreign companies to fully remit profits abroad, and it does not 
evaluate the potential effects of investments on the national economy or 
ensure that the country will somehow benefit before approving investments, 
which makes it easier and more profitable for foreigners to invest in Brazil, 
 
of total PAC resources had been spent, which says nothing about the actual completion of 
projects to which funds had been dispersed.  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 77. 
 178  Loudiyi, supra note 177.  Investment in the energy sector makes up about seventy 
percent of the Plan.  FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 77. 
 179  Loudiyi, supra note 177.  The extension includes $600 billion for energy investments 
($255 billion from 2011 to 2014) and $152 billion for housing construction.  Id. 
 180  DEMAREST E. ALMEIDA, BUSINESS LAWS OF BRAZIL 112, 132 (2009). 
 181  Id. 
 182  World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK, 
http://www.google.com/publicdata?ds=wb-
wdi&met=bx_klt_dinv_cd_wd&idim=country:BRA&dl=en&hl=en&q=foreign+direct+inves
tment+in+brazil (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
 183  See BAER, supra note 18, at 255 (noting the general increase in the flow of foreign 
capital to EMEs).  The stabilization of the real, which reduced the cost of doing business in 
Brazil, along with the large privatization program and rapid decrease in tariffs have all also 
contributed to the growth in FDI.  Id. 
 184  ALMEIDA, supra note 180, at 61. 
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thereby increasing overall investment.
185
 
Brazil’s large and sophisticated national exchange further facilitates 
foreign investment.
186
  In 2008, the São Paulo Stock Exchange merged with 
the mercantile and futures exchange to form BM&FBOVESPA, the largest 
exchange in Latin America
187
 and the fourth-largest exchange in the 
world,
188
 with a market capitalization of $1.546 trillion.
189
  Disclosure 
requirements for listing on this exchange are on par with markets around 
the world, giving investors confidence that all relevant information is 
available.
190
  All of these and other efforts have made it easier, safer, and 
more profitable for foreigners to invest in Brazil.
191
 
Lastly, as Brazil has grown, it has made a concerted effort to improve 
government institutions to make them more efficient for both Brazilians and 
foreign investors.  Most important among these reforms, at least as far as 
encouraging investment is concerned, has been reforming the judicial 
system.
192
  A 2006 constitutional amendment mandated judicial reform and 
made judicial expeditiousness a constitutional guarantee—an important step 
for a traditionally slow legal system.
193
  In 2007, the country passed a law 
that allows decisions from the Federal Supreme Court (the highest 
constitutional court in Brazil) to have precedential value if two-thirds of the 
justices concur.
194
  This change will prevent the courts from having to 
decide the same issue repeatedly, making the entire system faster. An 
efficient judiciary is cheaper and enforces rights more reliably—two factors 
 
 185  Id. at 61–69. 
 186  See Edmund Amann, Technology, Public Policy, and the Emergence of Brazilian 
Multinationals, in BRAZIL AS AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER? 187, 197–98 (Lael Brainard & 
Leonardo Martinez-Diaz eds., 2009). 
 187  ALMEIDA, supra note 180, at 35. 
 188  Robert Ellison & Claudio Oksenberg, The São Paulo Exchange – Towards A 
Regional Hub?, 17 LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP. 8, 8 (2009). 
 189  Brazil, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/br.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2012). 
 190  DEMAREST, supra note 180, at 49–51. 
 191  Amann, supra note 186, at 198 (highlighting two new laws as also playing an 
important role in encouraging foreign investment).  The “Lei das S.A.” (“Corporations’ 
Law”) is meant “to improve corporate governance practices in medium-size enterprises with 
the aim of . . . breathing new life into domestic private capital markets.”  Id.  The law also 
improves the rights of minority shareholders, as does the “Novo Mercado” (“New Market”) 
policy issues by BOVESPA).  Id. 
 192  Juan Carlos Botero et al., Judicial Reform, 18 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 61, 61 
(2003) (“Markets . . . depend on the establishment of an environment in which legal rights, 
especially property and contractual rights, are enforced and protected . . . .”) (citations 
omitted). 
 193  Sergio Sardenberg & Francisco A. Fabiano Mendes, Investing in Brazil – Latin 
America’s Powerhouse, 17 LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP. 13, 16 (2009). 
 194  Id; FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 17.  The law (súmula vinculante) is meant to 
encourage consistency as much as efficiency.  FISHLOW  supra note 101, at 187. 
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of keen interest to foreign investors.
195
 
V. CHALLENGES AHEAD 
Though Brazil has made substantial progess towards economic 
development in the last two decades, several challenges remain.  When Lula 
handed power over to his successor, Dilma Rousseff (the first female 
president of Brazil), his approval rating was over 80% and the economy had 
just grown by an estimated 7.5% in 2010.
196
  He had increased spending 
near the end of his term (ostensibly for political reasons), heightening fears 
of inflation,
197
 but President Rousseff promised fiscal restraint while 
continuing Lula’s policy of allowing the Central Bank to operate 
autonomously to control inflation.
198
  The promise to cut spending, along 
with a promise to cut the nation’s high interest rates, is what investors 
believe is necessary to ensure that inflation does not derail Brazil’s current 
growth.
199
  President Rousseff’s first major political victory—getting the 
legislature to agree to a lower-than-desired raise in the minimum wage—
surely pleased investors as it showed a commitment to reducing 
spending.
200
  Nevertheless, Rousseff’s presidency has seen its share of 
turbulence thus far.
201
 Economic growth slowed to below three percent in 
2011, inflation rose and remains above the Central Bank’s target, and a 




President Rousseff and her successors face a number of challenges as 
Brazil seeks to propel itself forward as an emerging economy.  First is the 
danger of excessive spending, which contributes to high interest rates 
(making borrowing more expensive), currency appreciation (hurting 
 
 195  Messick, supra note 34, at 121. 
 196  Albert Fishlow, Brazil: What’s Next?, AM. SOC’Y, Winter 2011, available at 
http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2096. 
 197  Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 147, at 12. 
 198  Brazil, supra note 189. 
 199  Joe Leahy & Samantha Pearson, Brazil Bares Budget Cuts to Damp Inflation, FIN. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2011, 2:54 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/68b09184-3492-11e0-9ebc-
00144feabdc0.html. 
 200  Sílvio Guedes Crespo, Imprensa internacional destaca 1ª vitória chave de Dilma, O 
ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO (Feb. 17, 2011), http://blogs.estadao.com.br/radar-
economico/2011/02/17/imprensa-internacional-destaca-1%C2%AA-vitoria-chave-de-dilma/. 
 201  Paulo Sotero, Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff Makes Her Mark, BBC NEWS (Dec. 
29, 2011, 3:58 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-16288184. 
 202  Id.  The decreased economic growth is more a result of the ongoing European 
sovereign debt crisis than any Brazilian policy.  Additionally, inflation has fallen in recent 
months.  Id.  Though the corruption scandals have distracted political discussion, Rousseff’s 
willingness to fire high-level officials accused of corruption has made her extremely 
popular—her approval rating is currently above seventy percent—which may help her build 
support around her economic reform goals in the future.  Id. 
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exporters by raising the cost of goods produced domestically), and a 
complex tax system (raising compliance costs, and in turn, business 
costs)—all of which are currently problems in Brazil.
203
 
Second, Brazil continues to depend too heavily on commodity exports 
(mainly food and oil) to drive growth.
204
  Like excessive spending, 
commodity exports put upward pressure on the domestic currency by 
attracting both foreign currency through investment in commodity sectors 
and the hard currency needed to purchase the exports.
205
  The appreciated 
currency negatively affects other sectors of the economy—in Brazil’s case, 
the manufacturing sector whose products are now more expensive and, 
therefore, less competitive globally—making the country even more 
dependent on commodities over time.
206
  Brazil appears poised to expand its 
dependency on commodity exports as it recently discovered huge oil 
reserves
207
 and has made enormous investments in its ethanol and 
agricultural sectors.
208
  These commodities are currently as profitable as 
they have ever been for Brazil, but that may have more to do with a global 
food shortage and over-speculation in the oil markets driving prices up than 
with any economic wisdom of the Brazilian government.
209
  The 
 
 203  Small Earthquake in Brazil’s Planalto, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2011, 8:33 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/10dc0994-2fcd-11e0-91f8-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1DbqqHTV7.  Spending is also troublesome in that it contributes 
substantially to indebtedness.  Indebtedness is a problem because it forces countries to spend 
foreign reserves on debt servicing rather than maintaining a balance-of-payment equilibrium, 
it increases the cost of borrowing over time, and it gives more bargaining power to foreign 
creditors when attempting to make policy changes.  BAER, supra note 18, at 233–34. 
 204  STRATFOR, supra note 118.  Iron, oil, sugar, soy, meat, and coffee make up forty-
seven percent of Brazilian exports.  Luiz Guilherme Gerbelli, Seis produtos são responsáveis 
por metade das exportações brasileiras, O ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO (Mar. 11, 2012, 8:59 PM), 
http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/economia,seis-produtos-sao-responsaveis-por-
metade-das-exportacoes-brasileiras,105640,0.htm. 
 205  STRATFOR, supra note 118.  Commodity dependency also leads to increased volatility 
due to more frequent price shocks, and has been associated with poor governance and a 
higher likelihood of civil war.  Paul Collier, Primary Commodity Dependence and Africa’s 
Future, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 2003: THE 
NEW REFORM AGENDA 139, 140–48 (Boris Pleskovic & Nicholas Stern eds., 2003); but see 
Nanae Yabuki & Takamasa Akiyama, Is Commodity-Dependence Pessimism Justified? 
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1600, 1996) (arguing that commodity 
dependence is not always correlated with low growth). 
 206  STRATFOR, supra note 118. 
 207  Brazil’s Offshore Oil: In Deep Waters, ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2011, at 48, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/18065645. 
 208  Sara Miller Llana, Farming Superpower Brazil Spreads its Know-How, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 12, 2008), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/1112/p01s01-woam.html. 
 209  STRATFOR, supra note 118; see also Rob Clarfeld, After the Gold Rush—Commodities 
Prices: Why So High?, FORBES (June 14, 2011, 1:17 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robclarfeld/2011/06/14/after-the-gold-rush-commodities-prices-
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government plans to put new oil profits in a sovereign-wealth fund to 
prevent increased spending from further pushing up the value of the real, 
but whether it will adhere to that policy long-term is yet to be 
determined.
210
  For the time being, an overvalued currency has already 
negatively affected Brazil’s manufacturing sector and forced the 
government to take strong action.
211
 
Corruption in Brazil is another major challenge.
212
  Transparency 
International, a non-governmental organization that measures corruption 
throughout the world, ranks Brazil the seventy-third least corrupt country 
out of one hundred eighty-three countries.
213
  The roots of corruption are far 
too complex to fully explain here,
214
 but it is important to note the 
contribution Brazil’s political structure plays in producing corruption.  
Brazil’s political system is such that it allows more than twenty political 
parties to participate in elections.
215
  These parties are in a constant 
scramble for government money in the form of welfare benefits, 
government jobs, and contracts that would help influence voters—a 




Third, continuing issues with Brazil’s regulatory and legal framework 
impede foreign investment by making it riskier and more expensive to do 
 
why-so-high/ (arguing that high commodity prices are the result of investors looking for 
somewhere to “park” the excess liquidity that has come about due to loose monetary policies 
globally, especially in the United States over the past few years). 
 210  Offshore Oil, supra note 207. 
 211  Joe Leahy, Brazil Vows to Protect Manufacturing, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b1d9f05a-6f8b-11e1-b368-00144feab49a.html.  Automotive 
production declined thirty percent from December 2011 to January 2012.  Id.  The 
government has offered manufacturers temporary tax breaks out of a fear that manufacturers 
will cut payrolls to try to maintain competitiveness.  Id.  Large payroll cuts would have a 
negative effect on domestic consumption—an important aspect of economic growth.  Id. 
 212  Corruption is problematic because of the distorting effect it has on investment 
allocation.  See Nauro F. Campos et al., Corruption as a Barrier to Entry: Theory and 
Evidence (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. DP8061, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711074 (arguing that corruption in the form of bribery by public 
officials limits the number of firms seeking to enter a given market). 
 213  Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
 214  For an in-depth discussion of the roots of corruption globally, see Vito Tanzi, 
Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures, 45 STAFF PAPERS – 
INT’L MONETARY FUND 559 (1998). 
 215  De Onis, supra note 111, at 117–20.  The proliferation of political parties can be 
traced to the 1950’s, when both global concerns about the capitalist model and national 
concerns regarding regional inequality began to appear and fracture long-standing political 
parties based on more specialized interests.  ROETT, supra note 38, at 49. 
 216  De Onis, supra note 111, at 120. 
  





  The National Federation of Industries termed these 
extra costs of doing business in Brazil the “Custo Brasil” (“Brazil Cost”).
218
  
Principal among these costs is the high tax burden mentioned above.
219
  
Taxes represent thirty-six percent of Brazil’s GDP compared to only eight 
percent in China.
220
  But besides the high tax burden, Brazil’s tax code is 
extremely complex, making compliance a lengthy and expensive process.
221
  
Brazil ranked 150th in the World Bank’s “Doing Business” ranking in 
terms of ease of paying taxes.
222
  It took the World Bank’s hypothetical 




Cumbersome regulations also make starting a business an expensive 
ordeal.  Regarding the ease of stating a new business, the World Bank study 
ranked Brazil 120th in the world.
224
  It takes an average of one hundred 
nineteen days to register a business in Brazil, compared to the regional 
average of fifty-four days.
225
 
A slow and inefficient judiciary adds to the Custo Brasil. Brazil’s 
courts simply have too large of a caseload to function quickly or 
efficiently.
226
  Though the courts have never been known as exemplars of 
efficiency, caseloads have skyrocketed since the country approved the 
 
 217  See Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L. BUS. STUD. 
807 (2006) (arguing that corruption results in a reduction in FDI, especially from countries 
that have signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions). 
 218  Don Sull, Brazil: Why it was the Country of the Future that Always Would Be, FIN. 
TIMES (July 27, 2010 5:59 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/donsullblog/2010/07/27/brazil-why-it-
was-the-country-of-the-future-that-always-would-be/.  According to one estimate, the 
average net margin in Latin America is 10.5%, but it is only 5.4% in Brazil, which has led to 
the conclusion that “Brazil is a high-growth market in terms of opportunities for revenue 
expansion but it is on average a low-margin market in terms of profitability, particularly for 
companies in the start-up phase.”  Joseph Leahy, The High Price of Booming Brazil, FIN. 
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012, 7:39 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/89e9e40c-5991-11e1-abf1-
00144feabdc0.html. 
 219  Sull, supra note 218. 
 220  Id. 
 221  DEMAREST, supra note 180, at 94. 
 222  WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2012: BRAZIL 72 (2012). 
 223  Id. at 73. 
 224  Id. at 16. 
 225  Id. at 17.  Brazilians have a sense of pride of sorts in finding ways around these 
regulatory costs, referring to the process of avoiding regulations as “jeitinho.”  Business: The 
Brazilian Model; Schumpeter, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2010, at 76, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/17522484.  “Jeitinho” is a play on the word “jeito,” 
meaning path or way.  Id. 
 226  Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Brazil: Developments under the 1988 
Constitution, 7 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 291, 311 (2000). 
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current constitution in 1988 that grants extensive personal rights.
227
  The 
increase in cases is also attributable to the highest court’s broad original 
mandatory jurisdiction.
228
  Of special concern to foreign investors, the 
highest court must approve all requests for recognition of a foreign 
judgment.
229
  Despite having taken steps towards strengthening the concept 
of controlling precedent to lower the caseload, it is estimated that ninety 
percent of the highest court’s caseload consists of questions that it has 
already decided.
230
  A former president of the Supreme Tribunal attributes 
the high judicial caseloads to the government’s bad faith refusals to pay 




Lastly, inequality is possibly the most commonly known threat to 
Brazil’s progress.  In spite of Brazil’s phenomenal growth, inequality is still 
an impediment: the World Bank has estimated that for every ten percent 
increase in poverty there is a corresponding one percent reduction in 
economic growth.
232
  For Brazil, this means that economic growth could 
increase by two or three percentage points each year by eliminating 
poverty.
233
  Currently, the top ten percent of the population accounts for 
forty-three percent of total consumption, while the bottom ten percent 
makes up just under one percent of Brazil’s total consumption.
234
  While 
CEOs in São Paulo make more money than CEOs in New York City,
235
 
over ten million Brazilians live on less than $1.25 per day.
236
 
Brazil’s inequality is not a new phenomenon.  It is generally blamed 
 
 227  Id. (“In the first eight years following promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, the 
number of cases filed in Brazilian courts increased by more than a factor of ten, from about 
350,000 cases in 1988 to more than 3.7 million in 1996.”). 
 228  Id. at 311–12.  In 2000, the highest court received 105,307 cases and decided 86,138, 
compared to deciding only 17,432 in 1989.  The U.S. Supreme Court decided just 115 cases 
during the 1999–2000 term.  Id. 
 229  Id. at 312.  This requirement even includes approval for uncontested divorces.  Id. 
 230  Id. at 313.  As Rosenn highlights, the repetitive and conflicting nature of decisions is 
not a necessary result of having a civil as opposed to common law tradition.  There are many 
examples of civil law systems that work more efficiently than the Brazilian system.  Id. 
 231  Id.  Despite all of these problems, it is worth noting that at least one observer has 
credited the strength of Brazil’s democracy since 1985, in part, to the quality of the judiciary.  
FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 187. 
 232  Coatsworth, supra note 41, at 8. 
 233  Id. 
 234  Brazil, supra note 189. 
 235  The Americas: Top Whack; Executive Pay in Brazil, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2011, at 35, 
available at www.economist.com/node/18010831 (noting that in 2010, the CEOs in São 
Paulo earned an average of over $600,000 per year, while CEOs in New York City earned an 
average of about $580,000 per year). 
 236  See Brazil Country Profile: Human Development Indicators, U.N. HUM. DEV. REPS.,  
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BRA.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
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on unequal educational attainment and unequal land distribution, both of 
which have their roots in the colonial era.
237
  During the colonial era, there 
was little need for education in areas heavily populated with slaves, 
therefore, there was no educational infrastructure in those areas when 
slavery finally ended in 1888.
238
  The educational attainment gap has only 
grown since that time.
239
  Wealthier, white Brazilians have continuously 
dominated politics and have chosen to invest Brazil’s money in the whiter 
southern part of the country, while generally ignoring the more heavily 
black and indigenous populations of the north, with the same disparities 
seen in cities throughout the country.
240
 
To compare Brazilian student achievement to student achievement in 
the developed world, President Cardoso entered the country into the 
Program for International Student Assessment run by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an international 
organization comprised almost exclusively of developed countries.
241
  
Brazil now ranks fifty-third out of sixty-five countries, although it initially 
came in last place when fewer countries participated, a mediocre result even 
by Latin America’s lower education standards.
242
  What marginal 
improvements there have been can be attributed to President Cardoso’s 
decision to mandate minimum per-pupil spending and teacher salaries along 
with the “Bolsa Família” (“Family Scholarship”) program.
243
  President 
Rouseff has already targeted improving the educational attainment of 
 
 237  Clements, supra note 115, at 46. 
 238  Coatsworth, supra note 41, at 4–8. 
 239  Id. 
 240  Id. 
 241  The Americas: No Longer Bottom of the Class; Education in Brazil, ECONOMIST, Dec. 
11, 2010, at 47, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17679798. 
 242  OECD, PISA 2009 RESULTS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 (2010), available at  
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/46619703.pdf.  Among Latin American countries, 
Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Chile ranked above Brazil, while 
Argentina, Peru, and Panama trailed Brazil.  Id. 
 243  No Longer Bottom of the Class, supra note 241.  Brazil still spends only a small 
amount per-pupil, especially in poorer areas, which receive less funding than other areas.  
FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 190.  Besides funding, poor quality teachers are an issue in 
Brazil as well.  To become a teacher in Brazil, a university student is not required to take 
courses on teaching skills or the subject matter they eventually teach, studying the 
philosophy of education instead.  Id.  Few people consider this to be the best way to train 
effective teachers.  Nearly half of São Paulo’s teachers fail to meet the minimum standards 
required to receive a permanent contract.  Id.  “Bolsa Família” is actually the umbrella term 
Lula created in 2003 when he expanded and combined the Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, 
and other social programs created by Cardoso in 1999 following the Real Crisis.  After 
combining the programs, Lula also increased their reach, nearly doubling the reach of the 
program from 6.5 million families to 11 million in less than two years.  Marcelo Neri, 
Income Policies, Income Distribution, and Distribution of Opportunities, in BRAZIL AS AN 
ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER? 221, 242 (Lael Brainard & Leonardo Martinez-Diaz eds., 2009). 
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Brazilian workers by introducing the new “Science Without Borders” 
scholarship program, which will send 100,000 Brazilians to top universities 
abroad by 2015 to study subjects the government believes are important for 
economic growth, mainly hard sciences and engineering.
244
 
A poor education system is related to Brazil’s land distribution 
problem.  The issue is most evident in Brazil’s largest cities where squatters 
have illegally taken up residence on any open space they can find.
245
  These 
illegal settlements have grown into entire neighborhoods, called “favelas,” 
where hundreds of thousands of people live with almost no government 
services, including schools.
246
  The residents of these neighborhoods 
(usually minorities) lack title to their land and, therefore, lack what many 
people consider their most valuable asset.
247
  The residents also face gross 
discrimination from employers, banks, and oftentimes the police just 
because of their address.
248
  The favelas are often overrun by drug gangs 
and usually lack basic services like running water and electricity.
249
  
Though the government has made progress in recent years against the 
gangs,
250
 the problems facing the favelas will not be solved any time soon, 
which will continue to effectively exclude favela residents from 
participating in the formal economy. 
One of Brazil’s most important policy goals has been to increase 
participation in economic activities by reducing poverty.  It has done so 
through the well-known “Bolsa Família” program.
251
  President Cardoso 
designed the program—with technical and financial support from the World 
 
 244  Studying the World; Education in Brazil, ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2012, at 46, available 
at http://www.economist.com/node/21550306.  A similar program in the 1960s and 1970s 
paid Brazilians who earned Ph.D.s in oil exploration, agricultural research, and aircraft 
design—three areas in which Brazil is now a world leader.  Id.  The country hopes the new 
program will have similar results.  Id. 
 245  Ermínia Maricato, Urbanismo na periferia do mundo globalizado: metrópoles 
brasileiras, 14 SÃO PAOLO EM PERSPECTIVA 21, 30 (2000), available at 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/spp/v14n4/9749.pdf (providing a detailed explanation for the rise of 
favelas throughout Brazil). 
 246  Schaller, supra note 171. 
 247  UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, ENHANCING URBAN SAFETY 
AND SECURITY: GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 2007, at 187 (2007), available at 
http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/getElectronicVersion.aspx?nr=2432&alt=1. 
 248  Schaller, supra note 171; Rosenn, supra note 226, at 151. 
 249  Myrna Domit & Alexei Barrionuevo, Brazilian Forces Claim Victory in Gang Haven, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, at A4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/americas/29brazil.html. 
 250  Id. 
 251  Bolsa Família: Changing the Lives of Millions in Brazil, WORLD BANK, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:21447054~m
enuPK:64282137~pagePK:41367~piPK:279616~theSitePK:40941,00.html (last visited Nov. 
12, 2012). 
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Bank—as a way to reduce current poverty and break the cycle of poverty.
252
  
Through the program, poor families receive money each month (about $35) 
on the condition that they keep their children in school and take them for 
regular health checkups, with the hope being that those children will grow 
up to be healthy, educated workers capable of supporting themselves and 
their families without government assistance.
253
  Eleven million families 
(approximately forty-six million people) benefit from the program.
254
 
The program has generated wealth at a grassroots level, with ninety-
four percent of the funds going to the poorest forty-percent of Brazilian 
society—most of whom had never benefited from social programs 
before.
255
  It allows recipient families to consume more (studies show that 
most of the money is spent on food, school supplies, and clothes for 
children), which has created a trickle up effect in which Brazilians sellers 
benefit from having more customers, and producers benefit from selling 
larger quantities of their products.
256
  The program has given a large boost 
to rural economies and has increased the federal and state tax bases.
257
  
From 2001 to 2008, the inequality gap shrank by six percent—the largest 
improvement in Latin America—and millions of people have been lifted 




As illustrated above, Brazil’s economic evolution has brought the 
country to a point where observers regard it as an important emerging 
economy gaining voice in global political and economic affairs.  The 
critical question is how Brazil will exercise its voice.  As illustrated by the 
Lula quotation at the outset of this Article, calls arose for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) in the aftermath of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. 
An NIEO is not a new concept.  It first arose in the 1970s and quickly 
became a highly controversial—and eventually unsuccessful—effort to 
effectuate the principle of sovereign equality of states by reforming 
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In December 2009, the UN passed a resolution entitled, “Towards a 
New International Economic Order.”
260
  The essence of the resolution was 
to reaffirm the principles set forth in the NIEO resolutions of the 1970s.  
The vote was 108 in favor to none against with fifty-two abstentions.
261
  
Those countries voting in favor were developing countries throughout the 
world, including EMEs such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China.  The 
developed countries abstained, including the United States.  In explanation 
of its vote, the United States noted that while it supported “the goal of 
moving toward a world in which all nations enjoy the benefits of broad, 
inclusive, and sustainable economic growth,” the resolution failed to offer 
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“fresh thoughts” and “innovative thinking.”
262
  The United States and other 
countries that abstained for these same reasons are right.  Trying to 
resurrect the NIEO of the 1970s is based on a failed paradigm. 
President Lula may well be right that a moral imperative calls for a 
new economic order.  Given it’s economic, social, and political evolution, 
Brazil is in a good position as an EME to draw attention to the need to 
begin a global dialogue aimed at articulating a framework for a new order.  
To sustain its voice, however, Brazil must continue to address the 
challenges identified in this Article. 
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